Opinie Clingendael 'Dijsselbloem for President?' (en)

Met dank overgenomen van euforum.nl, gepubliceerd op vrijdag 22 februari 2013, 15:16.

Adriaan Schout is Deputy Director Research Europe at the Clingendael Institute and has worked as trainer of rotating presidencies for seventeen years.

DEN HAAG - Finding suitable chairpeople/chairmen for EU meetings is extremely difficult. Since 'presidents' can be politically quite threatening they should preferably come from small countries. They should be rather gullible and non-threatening people.

As our euro notes prove, the EU has no shared values and that makes chairing particularly difficult. The design of the euro notes was a bit of challenge. With only 7 notes (from 5 euro up to 500 euro), any selection of people as figureheads on the notes proved impossible. Erasmus was Dutch and protestant. Jean Monnet was of course a pure technocrat and only known to a handful of eufiles - apart from being French. Hence, the notes depict the most self-evident symbols of unity (or dis-unity!) one can possibly imagine: bridges and windows. Yet, even these architectural wonders of our European history had to be imaginary because real bridges or window would cause jealousy.  The euro was supposed to be the symbol of our collective future that carry with us in pockets but actually shows that the EU lacks agreed values at least in economic terms.

This makes chairing the eurogroup extremely difficult. The paradox of European leadership is that leadership is about connecting, but with so many differences in values, interests and cultures, leadership is almost impossible. It can only be extremely subtle. Hence the emphasis on presidencies as honest brokers and on neutral presidencies.

Chairing the eurogroup is probably the biggest challenge because this is the meeting where battles are fought and which prepares the most sensitive dossiers for the European Council. The eurogroup is divided between north and south, it is dived over the role of the ECB, and it has to discuss reform programmes between debtors and triple A countries. As Juncker's  own track record shows, it is easy to run into all sorts of difficulties for example with Merkel and other heads of state over some sort of eurobonds.

The Dutch were very happy with a top position. Part of their ambition to chair stems from the frustration of being not one of the bigger countries (not realising that chairmen - Juncker, Barroso, Van Rompuy - come from small countries?). The newspapers were full of the fact that the chair is always best informed, in the middle of the negotiations and that it thus can steer negotiations. I beg to differ: steering negotiations should not be overestimated. Moreover, I doubt whether for example Van Rompuy is always optimally informed. France and Germany seem to be perfectly able to phone and mail each other directly. We have seen him presenting presidency papers that could almost immediately be retracted because France and Germany presented their papers and agenda's. Apart from being obviously overruled, it also proves that he is completely side lined whenever it suits the member states.  Van Rompuy has shown that he is very flexible (yes IMF, no IMF; no flexibility; yes flexibility in Deauville) and not easily insulted when over taken by the real power blocks.

What is worse, the costs for the Netherlands - and for the euro - can be high. First of all, there is no such thing as a neutral chair. If Dijsselbloem is even-handed, he will run into difficulties with Germany and with other EU countries at the same time.  Compromises are not regarded as neutral. If there is one thing that is really important to the Dutch than it is good relations with Germany. As Juncker's experience shows, chairing the eurogroup includes a big political risk vis-à-vis the Dutch-German relation. Secondly, it will be difficult for the Netherlands to fight for its interest. After the decision was taken to support Spanish banks through the ESM, the Dutch, Germans and Fins got together to dictate the rules. This post-hoc redefinition of outcomes of meetings - which always happens because ministerial meetings do not settle details - will be very difficult for the chairing country. Being a triple A country, the Netherlands should fear for its influence because the devil is always in the detail. Thirdly, the power balance may have been redefined by Dijsselbloem's new position now that the Netherlands has to sing a different song. Of course, there is now a Dutch junior minister at the table to defend the Dutch position, but everyone knows that that the senior minister sits in the chair. Finally, democratic control can be complicated. Discussions in Dutch parliament prior to important eurogroup or European Council meetings will probably be different. Minister Dijsselbloem now has so much confidential information through his many talks with eurozone politicians that will likely be restricted in his debates with parliamentarians.

Apart from these political costs, chairing means showing the eurozone members that the own house is in order. This is difficult enough for the Netherlands these days. It would have been good to invite a country to chair that is really making a lot of effort to prove financial markets that it is desperately reforming. An Irish chair seems to be the wiser option.

Finally, ministers come and go. Juncker stayed for a decade. Dutch governments change on average every 2 years. Acting ministers in the chair add the risk of a high turnover of chairpeople. This can be avoided by choosing a professional chair. Olli Rehn is available in 2014.