Analyse Clingendael: 'Waarom heeft de EU een gemeenschappelijk buitenlands beleid nodig?'(en)

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen is professor at the University of Copenhagen at the department political science

DEN HAAG - The EU lacks a strong and credible narrative on its common foreign policy and its role in global affairs. Professor Rasmussen thinks that the eleven foreign ministers of the future of Europe group are focused too much on the EU structures instead of the future of the EU. Denmark will not put a lot of effort in developing a strong EU narrative as it remains outside the CFSP.

On 10 December 2012, the European Union will receive the Nobel Peace Prize at a ceremony in Oslo. It is a fitting description of the state of European politics that it is a Northern European country which has determinedly and repeatedly rejected membership of the Union which finds it fitting to recommend the Union for its work for peace. Had Alfred Nobel entrusted his will to the British Parliament, the Parliament in Athens or indeed the Parliament of the Netherlands, one suspects that the Peace Prize would have been awarded someone else.

From an outside perspective the EU is indeed a force for peace; a force for peace which has transformed the nature of European politics after the Second World War. This outside perspective remains abstract and structural when seen from the European capitals themselves. In the places where the Union is not vilified on the streets and in the press there is a widespread weariness about the entire European project. Even if the Union deserves a prize for ending strife and conflict on the continent, does the Union deserve a prize for beginning a new chapter in European history?

The development of the Union's foreign and security policy is crucially dependent on the Union's narrative. Since the 1990s the Union has launched a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening the Unions' and the member states' foreign, security and military capabilities. Despite some successes, few of these initiatives have been able to deliver on the promises. However, the approach adopted by the Union has been to move on with new initiatives in the not unreasonable expectation that a new initiative would provide the momentum needed. This momentum depends on the ability to provide a narrative for how and why the Union should be a factor in world affairs.

The group of 11 foreign ministers of the future of Europe group recognise the need for a new European narrative. Unfortunately, they seem only to be able to imagine the future of the EU in terms of the successes of the past. Like the Nobel Committee, their statement is concerned with the structures of the Union rather than with the future of the Union. The foreign ministers mention the dual challenges of globalisation and the economic crisis arguing that the Union will need to "master" these developments "if we want our continent to enjoy bright future and effectively promote our interests and values". The foreign ministers are to master the foreign policy challenges in the same way as a carpenter wants to master his art. The entire document is focused on how the foreign ministers can be enabled to do a more effective job when they meet at the European Council in Brussels rather than on what they should achieve when they meet.

This is of course the classical, functional approach to European integration. To Jean Monnet or Robert Schumann this functional approach was a means to very clear political ends. These ends seem to be absent in the document. The foreign ministers have a number of suggestions on how to reform the European Union, but they seem unable or unwilling to explain why.

Perhaps the Danish foreign minister's participation in the 'Future of Europe'-Group is deceptive. Danes are as European as they are Euro-sceptical. Because of a constitutional requirement for referenda on European treaties the Danish position has been much closer to the population's views on the EU, than it has been the case in France, Germany and other core European countries. The position that came to the forefront of the debate in France and the Netherlands in the 2000s, was already present in the Danish debate - because of public pressure - from the 1990s. Denmark thus remains outside the formal structures of the CSFP, even if Danish officials are as active as possible in an EU-context and even more so in a NATO-context.

From a Danish perspective the Union's security and defence initiatives are about providing incentives for coalitions of member states to act. The Danish government and the people discussing this in Copenhagen will be focused on the merits of particular capabilities for particular missions. This confirms that Copenhagen is less committed to the overall narrative of the Union. The Danish government and the Danish public want more results and less talk. This also means that Denmark is not engaging in the difficult debate on first principles. Denmark does not have an answer to why the EU needs a foreign policy.